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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE AND LOCAL LAWS
TARGETING IMMIGRANTS
Karla Mari McKanders*
This symposium'is targeted at addressing current immigration issues
across the country, specifically in Arkansas, and how lawyers can seek to
achieve social justice for immigrants. There is currently much activity and
discussion surrounding state and local laws that target immigrants. Central
to this discussion is whether states and localities are constitutionally permit-
ted to enact immigration laws and whether state and local actions upset the
current immigration system and how, if at all, their actions affect docu-
mented and undocumented immigrants' rights.
Like other states across the country, Arkansas has been busily consi-
dering and enacting immigration laws. Arkansas officials have taken differ-
ent stances on state and local laws that target immigrants. On May 29, 2008,
the Arkansas Times reported that an organization was lobbying for laws
which provide that "public services could not be extended in the state unless
would-be recipients proved their American citizenship through authoritative
documentation."' The previous Governor of Arkansas, Republican Mike
Huckabee, strongly opposed a proposed Arkansas law that would have de-
nied immigrants public services.2 He described the proposed law as "race-
baiting and demagoguery." 3 "[T]he bill, seeking to forbid public assistance
and voting rights to undocumented immigrants, 'inflames those who are
racist and bigots and makes them think there's a real problem. But there's
* Associate Professor at University of Tennessee College of Law. Thanks to Ben
Barton, Yolanda Vazquez, Judy Cornett, Bridgette Carr and Elise Shore from Mexican
American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) for their comments. Thanks also
to Rebecca Bumgarner and Kathlyn Castilla for their research assistance. Special thanks to
my parents Kenneth and Carolyn McKanders for their encouragement and assistance.
1. John Brummett, Kansas City, Mexico, ARK. TiMEs, May 29, 2008, at 13, available
at 2008 WLNR 12106045 (Brummett reported that the "outfit calling itself [S]ecure Arkan-
sas" was led by Jeannie Burlsworth of Bryant, Arkansas).
2. Labor Department Gives Arkansas $850,000 Grant, U.S. ST. NEWS, June 24, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 10230426. Quite frankly, Huckabee was "delighted" that Arkansas
received an $850,000 grant that would establish centers that focused on "job placement assis-
tance, translation assistance, resettlement assistance and legal assistance" for immigrants.
Specifically, Huckabee stated that because "immigrants [were] adding [so] much to the cul-
ture and economy of Arkansas, [that he wanted] to do everything [he could] to make the
transition easy for them." Id.
3. Joseph Perkins, Debate Immigration Issue, Not Each Side's Integrity, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Feb. 18, 2005, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/
20050218/news lzl el 8perkins.html.
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not.' 4 He also believed that Arkansas should welcome hard-working immi-
grants of all races.
5
In 2007, the Arkansas State Legislature passed laws prohibiting state
agencies from contracting with businesses that employ illegal immigrants.6
Acting along the same line as the State, various Arkansas cities and counties
have considered laws that would declare illegal immigration a public nuis-
ance and impose fines on those employing or renting to undocumented resi-
dents. While considering laws against immigrants, the Arkansas legislators
also considered legislation that would offer in-state college tuition rates to
children of undocumented immigrants.
7
Arkansas is a microcosm of the various states across the country where
state and local officials are coping with the recent expansion of legal and
unauthorized immigration. In reaction to the growing population of immi-
grants, both state and local governments are passing laws that are intended
to target immigrants who reside in local communities, while others are pass-
ing laws to protect immigrants.8 Over the past few years, the number of
state and local governments considering legislation targeting immigrants
has dramatically increased. In 2006, local governments considered around
100 immigration related ordinances. 9 Similarly in 2008, state legislatures
considered approximately 1,500 immigration related laws. 10 These laws
exemplify the complex interaction among federal, state and local govern-
ments surrounding immigration issues.
When states and localities pass immigration related laws, the main
concern is whether federal, state or local governments are the proper level
of government to regulate immigration. The goal of this paper is to chal-
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-105(b) (2007) ("No state agency may enter into or renew
a public contract for services with a contractor who knows that the contractor or a subcon-
tractor employs or contracts with an illegal immigrant to perform work under the contract.").
7. John Lyon, Legislature to look at Illegal immigration issues again, ARK. NEWS
BUREAU, Jan. 25, 2009, available at http://arkansasnews.com/2009/01/25/legislature-to-look-
at-illegal-immigration-issues-again/.
8. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATES' IMMIGRATION
LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY STILL AT PEAK: EMPLOYMENT ENFORCEMENT AND IDs TOP LIST
WHILE STATES ADDRESS INTEGRATION, (2008) [hereinafter NAT'L CONFERENCE],
http:www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2008/prl 21808StatelmmigrationReport2008.htm;
NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, LAWS, RESOLUTIONS AND POLICIES INSTITUTED
ACROSS THE U.S. LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY STATE AND LOCAL
AUTHORITIES, December 2008, http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLawlocallaw-
limiting-tbl-2008-12-03.pdf.
9. Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! "Illegal" Immigrants Beware: Local
Immigration Ordinances and what the Federal Government must do about it, 39 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 1, 6 n.23 (2007).
10. See NAT'L CONFERENCE, supra note 8.
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lenge the position that states and localities should play a central role in im-
migration enforcement and regulation. To support this contention, part I
provides a brief overview of the historical roles of federal, state, and local
governments in regulating and enforcing immigration. In particular, the first
section focuses on the most recent state and local laws targeting immigrants.
These laws pointedly deny essential services of employment, housing, and
welfare benefits to immigrants often forcing them to relocate or self-deport.
Part II analyzes current case law and the federal circuit split on the constitu-
tionality of state and local laws. This section focuses on two precedent in
the passage of laws targeting immigrants: Hazleton, Pennsylvania, and the
State of Arizona. Part III discusses the implications of state and local laws
targeting immigrants.
I. HISTORY OF FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION OF
IMMIGRATION
A. Early Immigration Regulation
The U.S. Constitution contains no language that expressly grants Con-
gress the power to regulate immigration."' The Constitution only gives
Congress the express power to create a uniform rule of naturalization. 12 Pur-
suant to this power, Congress enacts laws which the the Executive branch
enforces. Regulation of immigration occurs when Congress enacts the laws
governing the entrance and exit and conditions under which immigrants can
remain in the country. The Department of Homeland Security and Depart-
ment of Justice enforce the rules under which immigration laws are ob-
served. The interior enforcement of immigration law involves the actual
execution of the decision making process regarding which immigrants have
violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) within the country, the
conditions under which the immigrants can work in the country, and condi-
tions of removal. Exterior enforcement involves preventing the entrance of
immigrants into the country. In reaction to current federal immigration poli-
cies, states and localities are attempting to take over federal regulation and
enforcement of immigration laws. States and localities are enacting laws
that target both documented and undocumented immigrants.
Despite the Federal Government's practice of regulating and enforcing
immigration, at the beginning of our country's history, the state govern-
ments were primarily responsible for regulating immigrants within their
11. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 192 (6th ed. 2008).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (stating that "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization .... ).
UALR LAW REVIEW
communities for two reasons: "First, for almost 100 years, it was unclear
whether the federal government was even intended by the Constitution to
have power to regulate immigration. Second, the United States officially
favored unrestricted immigration for about the same period of time after the
nation's birth."'13 Furthermore, "[b]etween 1780 and 1882, Congress enacted
only piecemeal immigration legislation, leaving passage to the States large-
ly unfettered. The few federal immigration and naturalization laws passed in
this period focused more on citizenship, health, and public treasury than
preventing foreigners from landing on the eastern seaboard."'
14
Not until the emergence of the Passenger Cases15 did the Supreme
Court begin to address state regulation of immigration.16 In those cases,
decided before the 1850s, "[t]he Supreme Court struck down laws enacted
in Boston and New York that imposed special taxes on aliens and passen-
gers arriving from foreign ports.' 17 Although the Passenger Cases prohi-
bited states and localities from imposing taxes on arriving immigrants,
states continued to set their own the trend of regulating of immigration
through 1875. In 1875, the Supreme Court decided Henderson v. Mayor of
New York18 which definitively barred state restrictions on immigration.' 9
This decision "declared state restrictions on immigration to be unconstitu-
tional as an infringement on the federal power over foreign commerce. 2°
After the Civil War, Congress began enacting restrictive immigration
laws that barred "undesirable" groups from migrating to the United States.2'
In 1875, Congress passed the first restrictive immigration statute which
barred convicts and prostitutes from admission.22 This continued with the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which barred all Chinese workers from
migrating to the United States for ten years and provided that courts could
not give citizenship to Chinese persons. 23 "In 1891 Congress passed legisla-
tion to prevent the entry of the diseased, the insane, polygamists and those
previously convicted of immoral crimes," which was specifically enacted to
13. DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 3
(5th ed. 2005).
14. KAI BARTOLOMEO, Immigration and the Constitutionality of Local Self Help: Es-
condido's Undocumented Immigrant Rental Ban, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 855, 857
(2008).
15. See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
16. BARTOLOMEO, supra note 14, at 859.
17. Id. The Court determined that because of Congress's plenary power under the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, "'[a] concurrent power in the States to regulate com-
merce is an anomaly not found in the Constitution."' Id. at 860.
18. 92 U.S. 259 (1875).
19. Id.
20. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 13, at 4.
21. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 13, at 6.
22. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 13, at 6.
23. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 13, at 6-7.
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prevent migration to the United States.24 This law also established the Bu-
reau of Immigration, the precursor to the Immigration Nationalization Ser-
vice.25 The 1900s were marked by more restrictionist immigration laws,
such as the enactment of the 1917 Act which excluded certain nationalities
from immigrating from Asia, Southern and Eastern Europe, and anarchists
nations. In 1921, the Quota Act limited certain nationalities present to three
percent present. In 1948, Congress enacted the Displaced Persons Act
which permitted refugees to migrate to the United States.
In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA") which solidified the federal government's control over immigra-
tion.26 The INA created an in-depth system that governs immigrants' en-
trance into and exit out of the United States and the conditions under which
immigrants can remain in the United States. Since then, Congress has
amended the INA several times. Further, there are extensive administrative
regulations that govern the implementation and enforcement of the provi-
sions of the INA. Moreover, in 1986 Congress passed the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA),27 which defines the conditions of em-
ployment for immigrants and anti-discrimination provisions to prevent em-
ployers from discriminating against immigrants while complying with
IRCA.28
B. Recent Federal Inactivity
Currently, state and local authorities are passing laws that target immi-
grants for various reasons. These reasons include the federal government's
failure to enact comprehensive immigration reform, the lack of resources to
enforce immigration laws, and the desire to displace immigrants. Some
scholars have articulated that immigrants are moving to states and localities
that typically have not had influxes of immigrants. Accordingly, states and
localities are arguing that they must enact laws that protect the health, safe-
ty, and welfare of the existing members of their communities. 29 For exam-
ple, former Arizona governor, (and current Secretary of Homeland Security)
Janet Napolitano, recently indicated that "[i]mmigration is a federal respon-
24. BARTOLOMEO, supra note 14.
25. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 13, at 8.
26. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified
as amended 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006)).
27. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000)).
28. Id.
29. Juliet P. Stumpt, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over Im-
migration, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1557, 1600 (2008) ("[tlhe transformation of immigration law
from a focus on foreign affairs and national identity to a seemingly domestic issue, touching
on center areas of state concern, has invited the states into the immigration arena.").
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sibility, but [I] signed House Bill 2779 [Legal Arizona Workers Act]30 be-
cause it [was] abundantly clear that Congress finds itself incapable of cop-
ing with the comprehensive immigration reform our country needs. 31
Recent, federal programs encourage states and localities to aid in en-
forcing immigration laws.32 This trend can be attributed to several things:
September 11 th, the failure of Congress to enacted comprehensive immigra-
tion reform, the economy, and immigrant movement into states and locali-
ties that have not been exposed to immigrant populations. Recently, the
Bush Administration authorized the "No-Match" program. The "No-Match"
program allows employers to use the social security numbers to verify em-
ployees are authorized to work in the United States. The No-Match program
is an electronic database that validates an employee's social security num-
ber to verify his or her immigration status. In addition, the United States
House of Representatives expressed interest in federal immigration authori-
ties cooperating with state law enforcement when it introduced the Clear
Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act ("CLEAR Act").33 The
CLEAR Act would require state officers to cooperate with federal immigra-
tion law enforcement in enforcing immigration laws.34 Additionally, after
September 11, 2001, the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel
authored a legal memorandum providing that states have the inherent au-
thority as sovereigns to enforce immigration laws.35
In support of state and local cooperation with the federal government
in enforcing immigration, some states have entered into 287(g) agreements
with Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). Under 287(g) agree-
ments, the Secretary of Homeland Security partners with state and local
police departments to permit them to exercise certain immigration func-
tions. Professor Kris Kobach, a staunch supporter of state and local laws
targeting immigrants, stated that:
Many states and cities have sought to maximize cooperation between
their law enforcement agencies and Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) [...] (1) by directing their law enforcement agencies
to utilize their inherent arrest authority more frequently, (2) by entering
into so-called "Section 287(g) agreements" with ICE so that their offic-
30. H.B. 2779, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2007) (codified at AIuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23-212 (2008)).
31. A.R.S. § 23-212, Office of the Governor, State of Arizona, Governor's Transmittal
Message (June 2, 2007) (Ltr. from Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano (July 2, 2007)).
32. Stumpt, supra note 29, at 1593 (stating that after 9/11 that federal government en-
couraged help from state and local authorities in regulating immigration).
33. H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003).
34. McKanders, supra note 9, at 17.
35. See Stumpt, supra note 29, at 1593 (stating that after 9/11 the federal government
encouraged help from state and local authorities in regulating immigration).
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ers can exercise the delegated authority of federal immigration officers,
and (3) by prohibiting sanctuary cities.
36
In alignment with this principle, Arkansas has authorized cooperation
with immigration authorities by entering into a "Memorandum of Under-
standing" with the federal government. 37 The Memorandum of Understand-
ing between ICE and Arkansas permits state law enforcement agencies to
verify the immigration status of all immigrants when they are arrested.38
Even though the federal government has authorized state and local
governments to cooperate with them in enforcing federal immigration laws,
the federal government has not enacted laws that give state and local gov-
ernments full authority to create laws targeting immigrants. 39 As indicated
above, in a limited number of circumstances the federal government has
sought cooperation with states and localities.40 Under these limited circums-
tances, the federal government has never delegated its responsibilities to
regulate immigrants' entrance, exit, and the conditions to remain in the
country, which would constitute the creation of immigration laws.1
C. State and Local Enforcement
There are a multitude of state and local laws that target immigrants.
For instance, some states and localities have passed "pro-immigrant" laws
encouraging immigration to their states, while others have passed "anti-
immigrant" laws that primarily deny immigrants essential services to force
immigrants to leave the states and cities. The following section briefly out-
lines the rationales behind such laws.
36. Kris Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What States Can and Should Do to Re-
duce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO.IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 478 (2008).
37. See Seth Blomeley, Beebe: Just Hear of Alien Law, ARK. DEMOCRATIC GAZETrE,
Sept. 20, 2007, available at http://www.nwanews.com/adg/News/201949/; Seth Blomeley,
No Extra Role in US. Pact, Beebe says, ARK. DEMOCRATIC GAZETrE, Apr. 9, 2008, available
at http://www.nwanews.com/adg/News/222237/.
38. See Blomeley, Beebe, supra note 37; Blomeley, No Extra Role, supra note 37; see
also, Boozman: 287(g) Welcome in NW Arkansas: Praises new agreements, region working
together, Sept. 28, 2007, http:www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ca50 bilbray/morenews/
boozman.shtml (stating that "four Northwest Arkansas law enforcement agencies imple-
mented 287(g) program, allowing state agencies to perform immigration law enforcement
functions).
39. See Michael Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption,
Prejudice and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 53 (2007) (stat-





1. State and Local Sanctuary Policies
Some states and localities have adopted sanctuary policies that prohibit
state and local authorities from questioning a person about his or her immi-
gration status.4 2 The purpose of sanctuary laws is to safeguard communities
by embracing neighboring immigrants (both documented and undocu-
mented), thus avoiding the creation of anti-immigrant sentiment. Another
reason for sanctuary policies is that if legislation requires state and local
authorities to report undocumented immigrants, undocumented immigrants
might go underground-further away from law enforcement officials. The
fear is that state and local officials questioning immigrants regarding their
immigration status while in the process of investigating another matter
would make it harder for immigrant victims of crimes to assist with police
investigations. 43 In addition, immigrants may be fearful of coming in con-
tact with other state and local agents in medical situations. Accordingly,
some states and localities have passed sanctuary laws with the belief that the
alleged harms of unlawful immigration are outweighed by the need for state
and local authorities to address crime and the safety of those who reside
within their community.
Maine and New Mexico have passed laws that forbid officials from
asking about a person's immigration status or informing federal immigra-
tion authorities about the presence of undocumented immigrants. 44 Similar-
ly, New Haven, Connecticut, implemented a "don't ask, don't tell policy"
for city officials who encounter immigrants. 45 Also, Stamford, Connecticut
created "no-hassle zones" to benefit day laborers. The no-hassle zones allow
undocumented immigrants to seek work without fear of arrest.
46
42. See Stumpt, supra note 29, at 1596 (explaining that Durham "passed a resolution
stating: '[N]o Durham city officer.., shall inquire into the immigration status of any person
or engage in activities designed to ascertain the immigration status of any person' except as
required by duty or law."). See also Rose Cuison Villazor, What is a "Sanctuary"? 61 SMU
L. REv. 133 (2008).
43. See generally Violence Against Women Act, INA § 204(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (pro-
viding protection to immigrants who are abused by Lawful Permanent Residents and Citi-
zens); INA § 101(a)(10)(U)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(10)(U)(i) (U Visas providing protection to
immigrants who are the victims of violence in the US and help with the prosecution of
crimes).
44. Laurel R. Boatright, "Clear Eye for the State Guy ": Clarifying Authority and Trust-
ing Federalism to Increase Nonfederal Assistance with Immigration Enforcement, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 1633, n.63 (2006).
45. Jennifer Medina, New Haven Welcomes Immigrants, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2007, at B 1.
46. See Darnell Weedon, Local Laws Restricting The Freedom of Undocumented Immi-
grants as Violations of Equal Protection and Principles of Federal Preemption, 52 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 479, 480 (2008). But see Roe v. Prince William County, 525 F. Supp. 2d 799
(E.D.Va. 2007) (In Prince William County, Virginia, a lawsuit was filed questioning the
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The legality of sanctuary policies is challenged based on their ability to
hinder federal enforcement of immigration laws.47 Additionally, states and
cities that pass sanctuary policies are characterized as being "soft" on immi-
gration.48 In Herndon, Virginia, taxpayers brought a lawsuit alleging that
the town passed a law protecting day laborers in contravention of the United
States Constitution's Supremacy Clause, the Immigration and Nationality
Act, and Virginia law.49 The Herndon law provided a "physical plant for the
Day Laborer site as well as funds to operate the site., 50 Although outsiders
viewed Herndon's act as pro-immigrant, the town's mayor stated that he
was not pro-immigrant and that he was only attempting to control the day
laborer situation.51 In an action that seemed to echo the mayor's words-at
least where undocumented workers were concerned-town officials closed
the labor center after a Fairfax, Virginia county court rendered a decision
that would require the center to service both documented and undocumented
immigrants.52
2. Anti-Immigrant Policies
Some states and localities are unlawfully passing anti-immigrant laws
that target employers, landlords, and others who seek to give immigrants
employment, housing, or other public benefits. These laws are purposely
enacted to restrict essential services to undocumented immigrants to force
them to either leave the country or relocate to another state and city.
53
The majority of the laws being passed are related to employing undo-
cumented immigrants. Employment laws sanction businesses for hiring un-
legality of an ordinance which permitted "police officers to question otherwise lawfully
detained persons about their immigration status and authorizing county personnel to deter-
mine what services might be lawfully denied based on immigration status.").
47. See generally Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., Maryland's Sanctuary Policies Isolate Federal
Law and the Constitution While Undermining Criminal Justice, 36 U. BALT. L.F. 149 (2006).
48. Villazor, supra note 42.
49. Karunakarum v. Herndon, No. 2005-4013, 2006 WL 408389 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 10,
2006)
50. Id.
51. Anita Kuman, Virginia Town Tackles Immigration: A Laborer Center Fuels Debate
as It Keeps Undocumented Workers Off Street Corners, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 11,
2007, available at http://sptimes.com/2007/06/l 1/WorldandNation/Virginia-town_
tackless.shtml.
52. Cristina Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106
MICH. L. REv. 567, 599 (2008) (citing Karin Brulliard, 'What We had Here Was a Family';
As Herndon's Day-Laborer Center Closes, Job Seekers Band to Find Another Site, WASH.
POST, Sept. 15, 2007, at B01).
53. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-212, Office of the Governor, State of Arizona, Gover-
nor's Transmittal Message (June 2, 2007) (Ltr. From Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano
(July 2, 2007)).
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documented immigrants. If an employer hires an undocumented immigrant
the state or municipality suspends the employer's business license as a sanc-
tion. Proponents of the employment laws incorrectly argue that these laws
are permissible under IRCA. They believe that the clause within IRCA that
provides for state regulation of business licenses, permits states and locali-
ties to suspend the business license of employers who employ undocu-
mented workers.
54
Following this trend, Arkansas passed an act that prohibits state agen-
cies from contracting with businesses that knowingly employ or contract
with "illegal immigrants. 55 This law provides that before a business can
contract with a state agency, it must certify that it neither employs nor con-
tracts with undocumented workers. 56 If the business utilizes any subcontrac-
tors, the subcontractors must assure the business that they do not employ
unauthorized workers.57
States and localities have also passed laws prohibiting landlords from
renting to undocumented immigrants. 58 For example, some of the laws per-
mit city officials to suspend or deny a landlord's business permit if he or she
rents to an undocumented immigrants. 59 The other model for landlord-tenant
laws attempts to target undocumented immigrants by placing restrictions on
the number of people that can inhabit a residence and by allowing others to
file complaints for violations.
For example, the town of Jupiter, Florida enacted laws that targeted
landlords who provided affordable housing to Latino immigrants through
"excessive and selective housing policies., 60 Under the Jupiter law, lay citi-
zens can submit a complaint alleging that a landlord rents to an undocu-
mented immigrant. The Jupiter laws gave the complainant total discretion to
determine who may be legal and illegal. This discretion opens the door to
profiling individuals that community members believe are undocumented
immigrants. Invalidating the Jupiter law, the Eleventh Circuit found that
"the discriminatory motive behind this ostensibly neutral ordinance was
clear throughout the enactment process [...] officials reassured local resi-
dences that a complaint driven scheme focusing on overcrowding would
54. See infra Part III.C.
55. Act of Feb. 28, 2007, No. 157, 2007 Ark. Acts 157 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §
19-11-105 (2007)).
56. Id; Gary Endelman & Cynthia Juarez Lange, STATE IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND
THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE, 1698 PLI/CORP 123,139 (2008).
57. Id.
58. See e.g., PELHAM, ALA. MUNICIPAL CODE, ORDINANCE NO. 429 (2007); CHEROKEE
COUNTY, GA, ORDINANCE NO. 2006-003 (2006) (currently has not been enforced due to liti-
gation).
59. See ESCONDIDO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE, ORDINANCE No. 2006-38R (2006) (never
enforced as court granted Permanent Restraining Order).
60. Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 529 F.3d 1027, 1033 (1 1th Cir. 2008)
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allow the town to target only the landlords of Latino immigrant tenants for
enforcement, without affecting the rights of other property owners.
' 61
In addition to employment and rental laws, states and localities have
attempted to limit undocumented immigrants' access to state benefits like
medical care, health programs, and other public services. To justify these
laws, states claim that immigrants deplete state resources and are a financial
burden. In 2007, the Arkansas Senate considered the proposed Arkansas
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act.62 Under this proposed law, undocu-
mented immigrants would be ineligible for public benefits and voting
rights.63 The goal of the bill was to require all public agencies to cooperate
with federal immigration authorities and to discourage illegal immigration.64
D. Impact of State and Local Enforcement
Anti-immigrant laws can cause immigrants to feel unwelcome and to
leave the communities in which they reside. The employment laws also
promote defensive hiring practices. 6' An employer will use defensive hiring
practices when they refuse to hire immigrants, even those with legal docu-
mentation, because they fear that they will mistakenly hire an undocu-
mented immigrant and be subject to sanctions. 66 Furthermore, state and lo-
cal police officers, without proper training in immigration law, often insti-
gate prosecutions of immigrants who may lawfully be in the country.
Anti-immigrant laws also have reinforced extra-legal activities like cit-
izen enforcement of immigration laws, hate crimes targeting immigrants,
harassment and discrimination against immigrations. 67 The anti-immigrant
61. Id.
62. See S. 206, 85th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2005).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Institute for Survey Research-Westat, Immigration and Naturalization Services
Basic Pilot Evaluation Summary Report for U.S. Dept. of Justice, Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service, p. 12 (Jan. 29, 2002) (stating that a state study also reported significant and
disturbing incidents of workplace discrimination that could be tied to confusion or lack of
understanding about the employment verification provisions).
66. Id.
67. Southern Poverty Law Center, Close to Slavery: Guestworker Program in the United
States, www.splcenter.org, (last visited on Apr. 15, 2008) (the great depression arrived and
Mexican workers were seen as a threat to American jobs). See also Southern Poverty Law
Center, Close to Slavery: Guestworker Program in the United States, pg. 6
www.splcenter.org, (last visited on Apr. 15, 2008), pg. 2 (stating that the National Socialist
Movement (NSM) one of the largest neo-Nazi groups in the United States, is planning a
march on Washington, D.C. on April 19, 2008 to protest the illegal invasion of America.
NSM believes that only heterosexual pure blood whites should be allowed citizenship. All
others should be stripped of their constitutional rights. The NSM further calls on the United
States to ban all 'non-white" immigration and to publicly execute black, Hispanic, and Jew-
ish 'criminals"'). See Megan Irwin, Flushing Them Out: Joe Arpaio and Andrew Thomas are
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sentiment instills a fear in immigrants, which causes them to flee states and
localities that pass anti-immigrant laws because they fear the extra-legal
activities that come along with the passing of the laws. This is particularly
true with Latino immigrants. Certainly, there is a correlation between legis-
lative enactment and extra-legal activities. First, states and localities pass
anti-immigrant laws. Then, the laws reinforce the belief that immigrants do
not belong, which authorizes citizen extra-legal activities against immi-
grants. This cycle will unquestionably prevent immigrants from "belong-
ing," regardless of their actual legal status.
II. PREEMPTION AND IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM
A. De Canas and Immigration Preemption
Under the constitutional preemption doctrine, state and local immigra-
tion laws should be invalid. The expansiveness of the INA and immigration
policy in general precludes state action. The Supremacy Clause of the Con-
stitution preempts state action where federal immigration law and policy
expressly or impliedly precludes state action. 68 The Supremacy Clause, Ar-
ticle VI § 1, clause 2 of the Constitution, provides:
[t]he Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance the-
reof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion, or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.
69
Under the Supremacy Clause, a state or local law can be expressly or
impliedly preempted. First, under the doctrine of express preemption, a
state or local statute is preempted if it clearly attempts to regulate immigra-
tion where Congress has direct regulatory authority.7° Second, the doctrine
Teaching the Rest of the Nation How to Terrorize Illegal Immigrants, PHOENIX NEW TIMES
Dec. 17, 2007 (stating that immigrants are being held hostage in drop houses where coyotes
call families and bribe them to pay money for the return of their family members);
EXTREMIST HUACK IMMIGRATION DEBATE: INCREASED REPORTS OF HATE CRIMES AND
DISCRIMINATION AIMED AT U.S. AND FOREIGN BORN LATINOS,
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/images/File/factcheck/hatecrimes01-08.pdf (last visited
Apr. 12, 2008) (Giving examples of violence against immigrants in different cities, for ex-
ample: in California, in August 2007, an immigrant working as a janitor at a fast-food restau-
rant, was taunted with racist threats such as, "Go back to Mexico, you wetback!" and was
then attacked by three men, one of whom was carrying a loaded gun).
68. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976).
69. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
70. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356.
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of implied preemption governs field preemption and conflict preemption.7'
Field preemption exists when Congress intends to occupy the field of immi-
gration and leaves no room for state or local action.72 Conflict preemption
occurs when a state or local statute "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
73
The preemption analysis "starts with an assumption that the historic police
powers of the states [are] not [to] be superseded by Federal Act unless [that
is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. 74
De Canas v. Bica75 is the key Supreme Court case addressing whether
state laws that target immigrants are preempted. 76 In De Canas, the Su-
preme Court held constitutional a California statute that restricted an em-
ployer from knowingly employing an undocumented immigrant, even if
such employment would not have an adverse effect on lawful resident
workers. 77 The suit arose when migrant farm workers sued farm labor con-
tractors, claiming that the contractors unlawfully terminated their employ-
ment pursuant to the California statute, which permitted employers to ter-
minate migrant workers when there was a surplus of labor.78 The California
courts accepted the farm workers' argument that state regulatory power over
immigration was foreclosed because Congress had enacted the Immigration
and Nationality Act as a comprehensive scheme governing all aspects of
immigration and naturalization, including the employment of immigrants.79
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument. 80 The Court de-
termined that it had never held that every state enactment that deals with
immigrants is per se preempted.8l The Court reasoned that "standing alone,
the fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a regu-
lation of immigration."82 Today, proponents of state and local laws targeting
or affecting immigrants incorrectly use this decision to justify state and lo-
cal immigrant regulation. De Canas, however, was decided prior to the
enactment of IRCA. The enactment of IRCA provided definitive evidence
that Congress intended to regulate not only the entrance and exit of immi-
grants, but also the conditions for immigrants while residing in this country.
71. See ld.
72. See Id.
73. Id. at 363.
74. McKanders, supra note 9, at 45 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)).






81. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 351 (1976).
82. Id. at 355.
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B. Federal Courts on Regulation of Immigration: Lozano and Napolitano
There is currently a split among federal circuit courts regarding state
and local regulation of immigration. The courts take two main positions: (1)
when states act pursuant to their police powers, state laws that affect immi-
gration are not per se preempted, and (2) the INA establishes a comprehen-
sive scheme that preempts state and local laws that target or affect immi-
grants. There are two noteworthy cases analyzing state and local govern-
ment ability to enact statutes and ordinances affecting immigration: Chica-
nos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano83 and Lozano v. City of Hazleton.84
In Napolitano, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Legal Arizona Workers
Act.85 This Act permits the state to revoke the business license of employers
who hire undocumented immigrants.86 The Act also requires employers to
use the e-verify system.87 "E-verify is an internet-based system that allows
an employer to verify an employee's work authorization status. '88 It is an
alternative to the paper based 1-9 verification system whereby employers
must obtain documentation from prospective employees to verify their citi-
zenship status prior to hiring.89
In Lozano, the city of Hazleton's ordinances addressed the presence
and employment of undocumented immigrants.90 Like the Arizona statute in
Napolitano, Hazleton's employment ordinance sanctioned businesses for
hiring undocumented workers. 91 The Legal Arizona Workers Act, however,
differs from Hazleton's employment ordinance because it mandates that
employers use the voluntary federal e-verify program to determine a work-
er's immigration status.92
In Napolitano, the Ninth Circuit found that the Act was not expressly
preempted. The court first held that the Act falls within IRCA's savings
clause.93 The savings clause provides that "[t]he provisions of this section
preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other
than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit
or refer for a fee for employment of unauthorized aliens. 94 Relying on the
language of this provision, the court found that the law does not attempt to
83. 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008).
84. 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
85. Napolitanao, 544 F.3d at 981.
86. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-211-216 (2008).
87. ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-105(b) (2007).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 496 F. Supp. 2d at 517.
91. Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484-85, 518-20 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
92. Napolitano, 544 F.3d at 981.
93. Id. at 985.
94. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006).
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define who is eligible and ineligible to work in the country.95 The court also
upheld the lower court's ruling that the provision requiring an employer's
use of e-verify was not preempted.96 The court found that even though Con-
gress made participation in the E-verify program voluntary, this did not
preclude Arizona from mandating participation in E-verify.
97
The court also rejected the implied preemption argument that because
Congress made E-verify voluntary, the mandatory nature of the Arizona Act
conflicted with a federal policy and would cause discrimination against im-
migrants.98 The court reasoned that Congress requires use of some form of
system to verify an employees immigration status whether it is the E-verify
or the 1-9 system, and plaintiffs could not show greater discrimination from
E-verify than the 1-9 system.99 The court ultimately held that regulating em-
ployment falls within the states' historic police powers and applied a pre-
sumption against preemption. 100
Contrastingly, in a lengthy opinion, the district court in Lozano held
that Hazleton's ordinances were expressly and impliedly preempted. 10 The
court found that the savings clause, on which the Ninth Circuit relied, was
intended for states to enforce, as a sanction for violating federal laws, the
suspension of an employer's business license. The court reasoned thatfirst
the federal government must find an IRCA violation, and then the states can
suspend an employer's business license as a sanction. The Lazono court
held that localities cannot make independent determinations of which immi-
grants are permitted to work.
Even though the Lazono court found that the employment provision
was expressly preempted, the court went on to analyze the ordinance under
the implied preemption doctrine. 10 2 The court found that the federal gov-
ernment's interest in the entire field of immigration was dominant.10 3 The
court found that the complex bureaucracy and intricate regulations evinced
Congress's desire to occupy the field of immigration. °4 In support of this
position, the court relied on the Constitution's Naturalization Clause that
provides that Congress shall establish a uniform rule of naturalization. 15
The court also found that IRCA's provisions are so pervasive that they prec-
lude Hazleton's ordinance. The court relied on the Hoffman Plastic Com-
95. Chicano Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 985 (9th Cir. 2008).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 985.
98. Id. at 986.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 984.
101. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 517-29 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
102. Id. at 521.
103. Id. at 521-22.
104. Id. at 525.
105. Loranzo, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 522 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4).
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pounds Inc. v. N.L.R.B.10 6 decision in which the court stated that IRCA
"forcefully" made combating the employment of illegal immigrants central
to immigration policy.1
0 7
In analyzing whether Hazleton's ordinance conflicted with IRCA, the
court found the Hazleton ordinance to be duplicative of IRCA and that it
would impose an obstacle to compliance with IRCA.'18 While Hazleton
required the employer to collect "identification papers" to be presented to
the Hazleton Code Enforcement office, IRCA requires the use of the 1-9
forms.109 In addition, IRCA does not provide for the verification of the sta-
tus of certain classes of workers, while Hazleton does not limit the classes
of workers who need to be verified. 110 The court ultimately held that Hazle-
ton's ordinance conflicts with and differs from IRCA and is therefore
preempted.' 1 l
The Lozano and Napolinano cases extensively cite De Canas as its
precedential guide in determining whether a state's regulation of employ-
ment constitutes regulation of immigration. 12 Although the Lozano court
found that reliance on De Canas was misplaced because the regulation of
employment was only a peripheral concern to immigration policy, the court
cited the passage of IRCA as evidence that Congress intended to create "[a]
complete statutory scheme ... that addresses the employment of unautho-
rized workers."''l In upholding the constitutionality of the Arizona Legal
Workers Act, Napolitano court relied on the De Canas language which
stated that "the fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not
render it a regulation of immigration, which is essentially a determination of
who should or should not be admitted in the country, and the conditions
under which a legal entrant may remain."
'"14
Both cases also consider whether the state employment laws violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and arrived at very
different conclusions. The Lozano court found that the ordinance did not
provide sufficient due process because it did not provide notice to an em-
ployee that he or she, allegedly, was undocumented. 1 5 Therefore, once a
complaint was filed, an employee would risk being fired so that the employ-
106. 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002).
107. Loranzo v. City of Hazelton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 518 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
108. Id. at 527.
109. Id. at 526.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 520 n.42, 525 & n.49. This case is currently on appeal to the Third Circuit.
112. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 983 (9th Cir. 2008); Lo-
zano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 524 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
113. Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 496 F.Supp.2d 477, 524 (M.D. Pa. 2007). But see Na-
politano, 544 F.3d at 984.
114. Napolitano, 544 F.3d at 983.
115. Loranzo, 496 F.Supp.2d at 536.
[Vol. 31
2009] STATE AND LOCAL LAWS TARGETING IMMIGRANTS 595
er could avoid the trouble of determining the employee's status. 116 The Lo-
zano court also found that the ordinance's resort to the Pennsylvania state
courts to determine an employee's immigration status was unlawful because
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) only immigration judges have jurisdiction to
determine an immigrant's status.
In Napolitano, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' due process
rights were not violated where the Arizona Legal Workers Act provided for
(1) submission of a complaint to the Arizona Attorney General; (2) verifica-
tion of the employee's status under 8 U.S.C. § 1373; and (3) enforcement
against the employer in the state court in the county in which the undocu-
mented worker is employed.' 17 The Ninth Circuit found that the creation of
a rebuttable presumption under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(H) of an employee's im-
migration status through the E-verify system was a sufficient procedural
safeguard. " 8
The Lozano court also struck down Hazleton's landlord-tenant ordin-
ance that sanctioned landlords for renting to undocumented immigrants." 19
Hazleton's ordinance was a tenant registration scheme that fined landlords
who did not obtain occupancy permits for their tenants. 120 The occupancy
permit required landlords to verify that they were not renting to undocu-
mented immigrants. The court held that Hazleton's landlord tenant ordin-
ance was at odds with the federal immigration system.'12 The court partially
based its holding on the fact that the federal system is uniquely equipped to
determine a person's immigration status. 122 The court relied on Justice
Blackmun's statement in Plyer v. Doe that "the structure of the immigration
statutes makes it impossible for the State to determine which aliens are en-
titled to residence, and which eventually will be deported.'
123
Interestingly, both cases' outcomes depend on the interpretation of
how, "immigration law" is defined. The Ninth Circuit interpreted Con-
gress's power to regulate immigration narrowly and classified the state's
ability to regulate the employment of immigrants as falling within the states
historic police powers. 24 While the Napolitano court held that the Arizona
statute was not a regulation of immigration, it opened its opinion by stating
that the passing of the Arizona state law was "aimed at illegal immigration"
116. Id.
117. Id. at 986 (citing ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-212).
118. Id. at 987.
119. 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 533 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
120. Id. at 530.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 531 (stating that there are "categories of aliens that have permission to work in
the United States but may not have proper documents").
123. Id. at 531 (quotingPlylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,236 (1986)).
124. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 984 (9th Cir. 2008).
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and "reflects rising frustration with the United States Congress's failure to
enact comprehensive immigration reform.0 2 5 Although the court states that
the Legal Arizona Workers Act is not a regulation of immigration, it ac-
knowledges that Arizona enacted the law because of Congress's failure to
enact comprehensive immigration reforms. This decision implies that be-
cause Congress has not enacted immigration laws states and localities have
the power to pass laws. This is additional evidence that the state and local
laws are crafted so that they appear to be addressing matters of state and
local concern, but are targeting both documented and undocumented immi-
grants. "As the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania stated
perfectly, '[w]hatever frustrations officials of the City of Hazleton may feel
about the current state of federal immigration enforcement, the nature of the
political system in the United States prohibits the City from enacting ordin-
ances that disrupt a carefully drawn federal statutory scheme.'
126
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit in Napolitano, the Lozano court correctly
and broadly interpreted Congress's power to regulate immigration. The Lo-
zano court found that Congress, under IRCA, had created a comprehensive
scheme that prohibited the employment of unauthorized workers and that a
state law that sanctioned employers by suspending their business license
prior to a federal finding of employment of undocumented workers was
preempted.
In another federal court decision regarding local regulation of immi-
gration, Gray v. City of Valley Park,127 the federal district court examined
"whether the employment ordinance in question involve[d] an area of law
traditionally governed by the states, the regulation of business licenses, or
an area traditionally governed by the federal government, immigration. The
court explained that "[t]here is an assumption that the historic police powers
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' 1 8 Like the Ninth Circuit, the
district court upheld the employment ordinance, finding that facially, the
ordinance appeared to be a licensing law.1 29 The court further explained that
because the ordinance only suspended the employer's business license, the
law was not constitutionally preempted. 130 The court also held that the plain
meaning of IRCA clearly provided for state and local governments to pass
licensing laws even though they involve issues of illegal immigration.131
125. Id. at 978.
126. McKanders, supra note 9, at 48 (citing Chicanos Por La Causa v. Lozano, 496 F.
Supp. 2d 477, 555 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
127. No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008).
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C. Immigration Federalism
As articulated above, whether a state or local law is preempted is con-
tingent on how immigration law is defined. The narrow construction of im-
migration law, as defined by advocates in favor of state and local laws,
gives states and localities the ability to pass laws that essentially allow
states and localities to regulate and enforce federal immigration and their
own immigration laws. If immigration law is defined as the entrance and
exit of immigrants and includes the treatment of immigrants in the country,
state action in this area is precluded.
Traditionally, immigration has been defined as the determination of
admission, exclusion, and the conditions under which immigrants can re-
main in the country. 132 "In reality, however, Congress has much broader
power over immigrant and alienage law and policy, including the ability to
regulate, 'the conditions of residence such as access to education, welfare,
and employment.'," 33 When Congress passed the IRCA in 1987, it extended
its authority from regulating the entrance and exit of immigrants to also
regulating immigrants' employment conditions. 134 Also, pursuant to federal
regulations the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services deter-
mines which immigrants are permitted to work.
35
Congress has plenary power over immigration law, which means that
courts have traditionally deferred to congressional authority in making deci-
sions regarding immigration law. The dispute over state and local regula-
tion begins when there is an overlap between states' traditional police pow-
ers to regulate the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens and the federal
government's regulation of education, welfare, and employment of immi-
grants while in the United States. 1
36
The current issue of how state and local laws are classified will, in
part, determine whether a state or local law withstands constitutional scruti-
ny. 137 Recently, some courts have held that state and local laws addressing
education, crime, health, safety, and welfare are clearly matters outside the
scope of immigration law. 138 State and local laws that have an effect on im-
132. McKanders, supra note 9, at 27 n.186 (2007).
133. McKanders, supra note 9, at 15. (quoting Evangeline G. Abriel, Rethinking Pre-
sumption for Purposes ofAliens and Public Benefits, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1597, 1626-27 n. 157
(1994-95)).
134. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, PuB. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986).
135. See generally 8 C.F.R § 274a.12 (2009).
136. Stumpt, supra note 29, at 1604.
137. Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047 (1994).
138. See, e.g., Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 989 (9th Cir. 2008);
Gray v. City of Valley Park, No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at *8 (E.D. Mo.
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migration and influence patterns of migration clearly are constitutionally
preempted. States and localities must cooperate with the federal govern-
ment, but only where the federal government initiates their involvement.
Laws that attempt to influence the movement of non-citizens under the
guise of protecting traditional state police powers over employment, wel-
fare, and crime should be barred.
139
Currently, state and local governments are attempting to regulate and
enforce immigration. Although the purposes of the laws declare that they
aim to promote the health, safety, and welfare of citizens, legislators readily
admit that the true goal behind the listed protections is to have immigrants
relocate or self-deport. 40 For example, the former governor of Arizona and
current Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, stated that she
wanted to restrict the flow of immigration in Arizona by enacting the Ari-
zona Legal Workers Act.14 1 Likewise, in Arkansas, Professor Kris Kobach,
a staunch supporter of anti-immigrant laws, indicated that the purpose of the
proposed Cherokee County ordinances was for immigrants to self-deport. 1
42
This is important to note because while states and localities allege that their
motivations are to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their communi-
ties, they also want immigrants to self-deport.
Immigration law scholars differ over which level of government
should regulate immigration. There are three predominant models for state
and local regulation of immigration: federal exclusivity, state and local co-
operation, and state and local regulation of immigration. Under the federal
exclusivity model, state and local governments would be barred from expe-
rimenting and enacting any laws in the area of immigration. 143 The concern
with the federal exclusivity model is that a blanket prohibition of state and
local regulation may eliminate state and local laws that benefit immigrants,
including state and local sanctuary policies.
2008).
139. Stumpt, supra note 29, at 1593 (explaining that "criminal grounds for deportation do
not distinguish between federal and state crimes").
140. Kobach, supra note 36.
141. Letter from Arizona Governor Janet Napolatino (July 2, 2007).
142. Kobach, supra note 36.
143. Michael Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power,
Equal Protection and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 493 (2001) (advocating for strict re-
moval of state and local involvement in regulation of immigration and alienage law and
arguing against state and local participation in immigration enforcement on civil rights
grounds. His article does not analyze the current state and municipal regulation of immigra-
tion, as it was written to critique the 1996 Personal Responsibility Work and Reform Act);
Olivas, supra note 39 (describing the relationship between the state and federal government
as hydraulic with the state and federal government ebbing and flowing as federal action
increases state action decreases and vice versa. He takes the position that states and localities
have no authority to regulate immigration).
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Under the cooperative model, state and local governments should work
in conjunction with the federal government in regulating immigration.
44
Under this model, the federal government would set the immigration policy
and seek state and local help when needed. In addition, under the coopera-
tive model, states and localities are permitted to act in a limited manner that
does not take away immigrants' rights, but allow the states to exercise some
authority.145 On the other end of the spectrum is the model that permits
states and localities to regulate immigration under the states' inherent au-
thority to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their communities.
1 46
This model also permits states and localities to experiment with immigra-
tion laws.
Some form of the cooperative model with the federal government ex-
ercising exclusive authority over enforcing and regulating immigration is
the preferable model. Under this model, the federal government will exclu-
sively set immigration policy and initiate interactions with states and locali-
ties as needed. Under no circumstances would states and localities be able to
enact or establish their own laws targeting immigrants.
In spite of the different arguments regarding which level of govern-
ment should regulate immigration, there is no question that when a state or
locality passes a law in which the federal government has expressly stated
that the states and localities cannot act, the states and localities have no au-
thority. Less clear are areas where the federal government is silent or where
states and localities are legislating pursuant to their Tenth Amendment po-
lice powers.1 47 The legislatures passing state and local laws targeting immi-
grants state that they are legislating pursuant to their Tenth Amendment
police powers, but the laws affect whether documented and undocumented
immigrants will remain in their state and sometimes within the country.
When this occurs, the doctrine of implied preemption should apply to bar
state and local laws targeting immigrants under the guise of protecting the
health, safety, and welfare of the state and localities.
The traditional implied preemption justification for why states and lo-
calities should not be permitted to target immigrants is that the U.S., as a
national sovereign, has the authority to decide which persons should enter
144. See Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty
and The Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373 (2006).
145. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regula-
tion, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008).
146. Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV.
1619 (2008) (positing that the issues regarding state and local regulation of immigration are
not really about immigration at all; instead, they are about local resource allocation).
147. U.S. CONST. amend X. The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
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and exit the United States. The foreign policy justification is another reason
why states and localities have traditionally been excluded from regulating
immigrants. The rationale is that the federal government does not want
states and localities to unnecessarily embroil the country in arguments with
other countries by their treatment of foreign nationals.1
4 8
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) supplies another justifica-
tion for preemption. The INA is a comprehensive act that provides a system
for managing who is lawfully within the country, adjusting the status of
immigrants, and providing guidance for immigration officers and judges
making determinations as to who fits the criteria under the INA. The expan-
siveness of the INA leaves no room for state and local regulation of immi-
gration.
III. CONCLUSION
The practice of employing state and municipal laws to exclude immi-
grants should be discontinued. State and local governments cannot cite and
allege the depletion of resources as the rationale for passing laws when the
real reason is to prohibit immigrants from entering their communities. Simi-
larly, states and municipalities cannot use state and local laws to cause the
removal of lawful immigrants from the community. 149 If states and localities
are permitted to enact immigration laws, our country will have fifty differ-
ent iterations of pro- and anti- immigrant laws. This will also cause state
and local governments across the country to compete with each other to see
who can pass laws to exclude immigrants from their states, so they will not
have to address any issues that come along with migration and integrating
immigrants into their communities. This will essentially result in a down-
ward spiral of states with laws that exclude (a race to the bottom) as states
and localities attempt to enact laws which result in immigrants relocating or
self-deporting. This will cause the unequal regulation and enforcement of
immigration laws which may lead to violations of immigrants' rights. This
can all be halted with the federal government taking an active role in enforc-
ing existing immigration laws and enacting laws that clearly articulate that
federal government regulates immigration and defines the conditions under
which states and localities can aid the federal government.
148. McKanders, supra note 9, at 37.
149. See Am. Ins. Ass'n. v. Garamedi, 539 U.S. 396, 423-24, 427 (2003) (stating that
California could not "employ [a] different state system of economic pressur[e]" to address an
issue touching on foreign relations nor "use an iron fist where the [federal government] has
consistently chosen kid gloves.").
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